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iii

ARGUMENT
L

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN AWARDING DAMAGES BASED ON
A PUNITIVE LIQUIDATED DAMAGES PROVISION.
Utah "has long had a policy against the imposition of liquidated damages that

constitute a penalty for breach of a contractual agreement." Woodhaven Apts. v.
Washington, 942 P.2d 918, 920 (Utah 1997). The goal of contract damages is
compensation, not punishment of any perceived wrong. See Cook Assocs., Inc. v.
Warnick, 664 P.2d 1161, 1167 (Utah 1983) ("It is settled as a general rule . . . that a
plaintiff cannot recover punitive damages for a breach of contract")
Notwithstanding CRE's arguments, the liquidated damages award in this case is
punitive in nature and represents an extraordinary financial windfall for CRE. Such a
windfall is wholly contrary to the purpose of contract damages. See, e.g., Western Oil &
Fuel Co. vj£em£, 245 F.2d 633, 644 (8th Cir. 1957) ("A party recovering damages for
breach of contract should not be better off because of the breach than he would have been
had there been no breach."). The award has no reasonable relationship to CRE's actual
damages and is grossly excessive on its face. Moreover, the District Court's entry of
summary judgment was error because there was a dispute between the parties as to the
existence and amount of CRE's actual damages. In addition, the District Court failed to
properly apply Section 339 of the Restatement (First) of Contracts ("Section 339").
Therefore, the judgment should be reversed.
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A.

The Liquidated Damages Award Lacks Any Reasonable Relationship
to CRE's Actual Damages.

Utah does not enforce liquidated damages provisions when enforcement would
result in an award "bearing no reasonable relationship to the actual damages suffered."
Perkins v. Spencer, 243 P.2d 446, 449-50 (Utah 1952). As this Court stated in Madsen v.
Anderson, 667 P.2d 44 (Utah 1983), it is the general rule that:
[P]arties to a contract may agree to liquidated damages in the case of
breach, and such agreements are enforceable if the amount of the
liquidated damages agreed to is not disproportionate to the damages
actually sustained.
Id. at 47 (emphasis added). However, when "the amount of liquidated damages bears no
reasonable relationship to the actual damage or is so grossly excessive as to be entirely
disproportionate to any possible loss that might have been contemplated that it shocks the
conscience the stipulation will not be enforced." Warner v. Rasmussen, 704 P.2d 559,
561 (Utah 1985).
Notwithstanding the fact that Comcast continued to pay rent, and CRE has
received the full financial compensation due under the lease, even during those periods
when the premises were unoccupied, the District Court awarded CRE liquidated damages
based solely on Comcast's failure to continuously operate the property. The $3,760,553
judgment includes an award of double-rent totaling $1,739,613, prejudgment interest in
the amount of $2,008,541, late fees of $8,400, and attorney's fees in the fixed amount of
$4,000. (R. 743-44.) Excluding interest, CRE obtained a judgment that is, at minimum,
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255% of its own estimate of actual damages.1 The judgment is even more shocking in
light of evidence introduced by Comcast that CRE suffered no actual damages, and that
CRE's actual damages, in any event, could not have exceeded $120,000. (R. 492-574.)
Assuming actual damages of $120,000, the judgment is approximately 1,450 % of any
actual damages CRE sustained. CRE paid $1,850,000 to construct the building on the
Property and stands to obtain a windfall that, with interest, amounts to more than double
its construction costs. (R. 705.) It is undisputed that Comcast and TCI paid all base rent
due on a timely basis and that CRE will receive a total of $5,510,000 in base rent over the
term of the Lease. (R. 719.) Based on the double-rent CRE stands to obtain based on the
liquidated damages provision in this case, the total rents CRE will receive is $7,249,613.3

CRE presented evidence below that its damages amounted to $680,000, which
represents just over one-third of the liquidated damages ultimately awarded in this case.
(R. 170-74, 203.) Comcast disputed this estimate of damages, but contends that the
liquidated damages award at issue here is grossly excessive even if CRE's estimate is
accepted.
CRE attempts to minimize the evidence of the disproportionality of the
liquidated damages in this case by arguing that Comcast's evidence of its actual damages
was uncertain in that it provided both a likely damages estimate of zero and a worst-cast
estimate of $120,000. (Appellee's Brief, 20.) This argument, however, ignores the fact
that, even if CRE's own estimate were accepted as fact, the actual damages in this case
would still bear no relationship to the liquidated damages award.
3

While the requirement to pay double rent for failure to operate a leasehold may
make sense in the context of a large shopping center lease where an anchor tenant's
decision to vacate space has a tangible effect on the viability of the shopping center, no
such circumstance exists here. This Lease was for office space in a single office
building. There was no larger impact on the economic viability of the office building or
the ability to lease office space by virtue of the vacancy. Additionally, Comcast
continued to pay rent which ensured no significant economic harm to CRE as a result of
the vacancy.
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Taking into consideration both the rent paid and the damage award in this case, with
interest, CRE stands to obtain a $9.3 million return on its investment of less than $2
million. In short, CRE stands to obtain a windfall that far exceeds the expected benefit of
its bargain and is grossly disproportionate to any damages that CRE can claim to have
incurred. These damages are shockingly exorbitant, and the judgment should be
reversed.
CRE argues, erroneously, that under Robbins v. Finlay, 645 P.2d 623 (Utah 1982),
"even if the liquidated damages are in a range which is between 15 times the amount of
the actual damages to 10% of the actual damages, the courts can still enforce the
liquidated damages provision."4 (Appellee's Brief, 28.) Robbins did not hold that a
liquidated damages awards of up to fifteen times the amount of actual damages can or
should be sustained. Robbins dealt with the narrow issue of a $5,000 liquidated damages
judgment against a hearing aid salesman for misappropriation of sales leads. Robbins,
645 P.2d at 627. This Court noted the record lack evidence of any actual profits, but
observed that, taking into account commissions due the defendant, the potential profit per
sale would amount to $335 for a single hearing aid and $720 for a double. Id. Thus, the
potential range of actual damages was between $6,700 for twenty sales of single hearing
aids, to over $50,000 if for 154 sales. Id.

4

In so arguing, CRE ignores its own citation to Reliance, 858 P.2d at 1368 for
the basic rule that "no precise mathematical formula exists for determining when
liquidated damages are reasonably proportionate to the contract price." (Appellee's
Brief, 27.)
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At no point did Robbins, as CRE suggests, hold that the range of potential actual
damages was between $335 and $5,000. Rather, Robbins reasoned that the possible
damages, even if as few as twenty sales were made using misappropriated leads, were
reasonable in proportion with a $5,000 liquidated damages award. Id. The dollar amount
at issue in this case far exceeds the award in Robbins, even adjusted for inflation, and
CRE cannot dispute that there is a gross disparity between any actual damages it may
have sustained and its liquidated damages award. The District Court acknowledged this
disparity, but failed to acknowledge the lack of any reasonable relationship between the
liquidated damages and actual damages. (R. 653, 722.)
It bears emphasis that the liquidated damages award in this case far exceeds
awards that Utah courts have routinely rejected. For example, this Court has rejected a
liquidated damages award amounting to approximately 351% of actual damages as
excessive. See Soffe v. Ridd, 659 P.2d 1082, 1084 (Utah 1983) ("Liquidated damages of
$20,725 do not bear a reasonable relationship to $5,895 actual damages.") Similarly, in
Johnson v. Carman, 572 P.2d 371 (Utah 1977) this Court rejected a liquidated damages
award that would allow a seller of real estate "to retain payments totaling some 34%
greater than the actual damages determined by the trial court" as excessive. Id. at 373;
see also Allen v. Kingdom 723 P.2d 394, 397 (Utah 1986) (rejecting liquidated damages
award of $10,800, which represented 288% of actual loss amounting to $3,746).
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B.

The District Court Erred in Granting Summary Judgment When
There Was a Dispute as to the Material Fact of CRE's Actual
Damages.

Under Utah law, the existence and amount of actual damages is a key issue that a
court must consider in determining the validity of a liquidated damages provision. E.g.,
Perkins, 243 P.2d at 449-50 (liquidated damages provision invalid if resulting award
bears no relationship to actual damages); Woodhaven, 942 P.2d at 922 (holding that in
the absence of evidence as to actual damages, it would be improper to sustain a liquidated
damages award). Here, the District Court directly acknowledged that there was an issue
of fact as to whether CRE had sustained any damages at all, and that there was a gross
disparity between CRE's $680,000 estimate of its actual damages and liquidated
damages. (R. 653, 708, 722.) The District Court then erroneously entered summary
judgment in CRE's favor.
In Wilson v. Johnson, 2010 UT App. 137, the Utah Court of Appeals addressed a
case involving a claimed breach of a real estate purchase contract. Id. at ^ 1-4. Both
parties moved for summary judgment, and the trial court entered summary judgment in
favor of the plaintiffs, awarding them $40,000 in liquidated damages. Id. at ^f 5. The
Court of Appeals reversed, holding that summary judgment was improper because there
was a factual dispute as to the payment terms and the parties' intent. Id. at ^f 26.
Similarly, in this case, there is a dispute between the parties as to whether CRE suffered
any damages and a question as to what types of damage, if any, the liquidated damages
provision was intended to remedy.
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CRE mistakenly relies on Bair v. Axiom Design, 2001 UT 20, 20 P.3d 388, and
Young Electric Sign Co. v. United Standard West, Inc., 755 P.2d 162 (Utah 1988), to
support the proposition that the District Court's failure to consider evidence of actual
damages was not in error. (Appellee's Brief at 25.) These cases do not, as CRE
suggests, stand for the proposition that courts are free to ignore evidence relating to the
amount of actual damages sustained in considering the validity of a liquidated damages
award. Rather, they hold that an enforceable liquidated damages clause can "obviate the
need for the non-breaching party to prove actual damages." Bair, 2001 UT 20, ^f 25, 20
P.3d at 394; accord Young, 755 P.2d at 165 ("If a liquidated damages provision is
enforceable, a plaintiff need not prove actual damages.") In other words, if the elements
of Section 339 can be satisfied without reference to actual damages, it would be
appropriate to uphold a liquidated damages award. Young, 755 P.2d at 165.
Bair addressed a situation in which a photographic transparency leasing company
sought liquidated damages against a defendant for failure to return transparencies. Bair,
2001 UT 20, fflfl- 25, 20 P.3d at 389-94. Nothing in Bair indicates that the defendant,
who opposed enforcement of the liquidated damages provision, presented any evidence
as to the amount of the actual damages the plaintiff sustained. Bair was reversed and
remanded for new trial in part because the trial court had improperly placed the burden of
proving that the liquidated damages provision represented a reasonable forecast of actual
damages on the plaintiff. Id. at % 26. Thus, Bair does not support CRE's argument that
the District Court properly ignored the evidence presented concerning actual damages.
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Similarly, Young addressed the validity of liquidated damages provision in a lease
for a custom-made sign. In that case, the defendant made no effort to "assert or prove
that liquidated damages were unreasonably disproportionate to compensatory damages."
Young, 755 P.2d at 165. Young actually considered the amount of the plaintiffs possible
actual damages and concluded that if actual damages were awarded, they would have
exceeded the liquidated damages award by only twenty-five percent. Id.
This is not case in which the elements of Section 339 could be met without
considering the issue of actual damages. While the District Court acknowledged that
"[t]he true gravaman [sic] of this analysis must be whether the parties were attempting in
good faith to arrive at a fair way to determine what actual damages might be," the Court
also observed that it had been presented with no evidence as to why a liquidated damages
provision was included in the Lease, or what damages it was intended to address. (R.
653-55.) Comcast disagrees that it was required to present evidence of the parties'
negotiations to satisfy this requirement. Indeed, Comcast argued that the provision was
unenforceable based both on the Lease itself and on evidence of actual damages. CRE,
apart from presenting its own estimate of actual damages (which is still grossly
disproportionate to the liquidated damages award), points to no evidence in the record
that supports the District Court's conclusion that the liquidated damages provision
represented a good faith effort "to arrive at a fair way to determine what actual damages
might be." (R. 654.) Put simply, the District Court erred in ruling that Comcast failed to
meet its burden of establishing the invalidity of the liquidated damages provision and,
therefore, in denying Comcast's summary judgment motion. Moreover, because CRE
DMWEST #7770297 v2
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failed to submit any evidence to controvert what the District Court considered to be the
"gravamen" of its ruling, the District Court erred in granting CRE's summary judgment
motion. Finally, assuming there is any remaining material question of fact on this issue,
the case should be remanded for further proceedings, including discovery and, if
necessary, trial.
C.

The District Court Failed to Properly Apply Section 339 in
Considering the Enforceability of the Liquidated Damages Provision.
1.

Comcast Met Its Burden of Demonstrating that the Liquidated
Damages Award Did Not Constitute a Reasonable Forecast of Just
Compensation.

Comcast met its burden of establishing that the liquidated damages award did not
constitute a reasonable forecast of just compensation for any harm that CRE could have
sustained.5 Evidence as to the amount of actual damages is admissible to establish that a
liquidated damages award does not constitute a reasonable forecast of just compensation.
While Utah cases have stated that the party opposing enforcement of a
liquidated damages provision bears the burden of establishing its validity, Section 339
states that liquidated damages provisions are presumptively invalid. Section 339 states in
pertinent part:
(1)
[A]n agreement, made in advance of breach fixing damages
therefore, is not enforceable as a contract and does not affect the
damages recoverable for the breach, unless
(a)
the amount so fixed is a reasonable forecast of just
compensation for the harm that is caused by the breach, and
(b)
the harm that is caused by the breach is one that is
incapable or very difficult of accurate estimation.
Restatement (First) of Contracts, § 339. Further, Utah courts have traditionally viewed
liquidated damages provisions "with some degree of suspicion because they may not
reasonably approximate compensatory damages." Robbins, 645 P.2d at 625.
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Reliance Ins. Co. v. Utah Dept. of Transp., 858 P.2d 1363, 1366 (Utah 1993) ("If, on the
other hand, the liquidated damages are disproportionate to the actual compensatory
damages sustained, this may be evidence of an unreasonable forecast and the provision
may be deemed a penalty and not enforced."). The liquidated damages awarded in this
case are grossly disproportionate even to CRE's estimate of actual damages, and does not
represent a reasonable forecast of just compensation.
CRE contends that the District Court's ruling should be upheld because "Comcast
presented no evidence to the trial court from anyone who participated in the discussions
between the parties which led to the lease or the liquidated damages provision."
(Appellee's Brief, 14.) In other words, CRE's position is that the only way to determine
the invalidity of the liquidated damages provision would be to delve into communications
between TCI and CRE that took place more than fifteen years ago at the time the Lease
was executed. Of course, this is directly contrary to the Utah cases which uniformly hold
that evidence of actual damages sustained can serve to demonstrate that a liquidated
damages provision was an unreasonable forecast. Moreover, if the absence of such
testimony was determinative, the District Court should have denied both parties' motions
and permitted them to conclude discovery.
CRE also ignores well-established law with respect to contract interpretation under
which the intentions of the parties are best determined not from extraneous evidence, but
from the contract itself. See Peterson & Simpson v. IHC Health Servs., Inc., 2009 UT
54, *| 13, 217 P.3d 716 ("As with any contract, we determine what the parties have agreed
upon by looking first to the plain language within the four corners of the document.");
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Perkins, 243 P.2d at 451 (interpretation of a liquidated damages provision "depends upon
an interpretation of the whole instrument in the light of all of the circumstances
surrounding the transaction"). The Lease itself is evidence that the liquidated damages
provision does not represent a reasonable forecast of just compensation for any harm to
CRE. There is no great mystery as to the types of damages that arise from the breach of a
lease: loss of rental income, costs related to re-letting the property, and, possibly,
diminution in value. Comcast presented evidence that CRE suffered no such losses.6
While CRE claims that it had anticipated that TCI would serve as an "anchor tenant"
driving nearby development, the District Court found that no such intentions were
manifest in the Lease and that CRE never made TCI or Comcast aware of its alleged
intentions. (R. 710). Nothing in the Lease indicates any basis upon which to justify the
absurd result that the rental value of the Property while vacaitt is triple that of the
Property with a tenant present.
2.

The Alleged Harm Caused by TCFs Failure to Occupy the Property
Was Not Difficult to Estimate.

The District Court opined that because the Lease did not specify the types of
damages to be remedied by the liquidated damages provision, it "had difficulty
determining whether it was possible for the parties to reach an accurate estimate of
damages which were hypothetical at the time the contract wais formed." (R. 724.) This
constitutes reversible error in two respects.
6

Nor did CRE attempt to sell the Property, which would be a necessary part of
establishing any claim for diminution in value based on the failure of TCI and Comcast to
continually operate from the premises.
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First, Comcast had met its burden of establishing that the damages at issue in this
case could be accurately estimated. As set forth above, the types of damages that the
parties should have anticipated are readily apparent from the Lease itself. Utah courts
have repeatedly looked to the language of the contract and transaction at issue to
determine whether liquidated damages could reasonably be estimated. See Perkins, 243
P.2d at 450-51 (examining type of contract and determining that the damages were of a
type that could be easily determined); Woodhaven, 942 P.2d at 922-23 (examining type
of contract and possible damages).
In Prudential Capital Group Co. v. Mattson, 802 P.2d 104 (Utah Ct. App. 1990),
the Utah Court of Appeals addressed a case in which a plaintiff sought future lease
payments from the defendant based on a liquidated damages provision in an aircraft
lease. Id- at 105-07. Recognizing that it could not "compare actual damages against
stipulated liquidated damages where the court made no findings as to actual damages,"
the court instead looked to the language of the lease itself to determine the possible actual
damages, concluding that the full value of rent would have been $1,279,589, while the
liquidated damages award amounted only to $246,462. Id. at 107.
The contract in this case is a commercial lease. The District Court, following the
example of Perkins, Woodhaven, and Mattson, could have easily drawn conclusions as to
the types of damages that are available for a breach of a commercial lease. Indeed,
Comcast argued below that lost rents and cost of reletting were the principal damages that
could be anticipated in the event of a breach. (R. 485-89.)
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CRE argues that the liquidated damages represent a reasonable forecast because
"it is clear that the parties reasonably anticipated that CRE would suffer damages if TCI
or Comcast abandoned the building prior to the expiration of4the lease term." (Appellee's
Brief, 21.) In other words, CRE claims the disputed liquidated damages must constitute a
reasonable forecast of damages because the Lease provides a means for their calculation.
If that was the limit of the required analysis, no liquidated damage provision could ever
be found to be unenforceable.
CRE then speculates that "an empty building is more likely to need expensive
repairs." (Id-) But the liquidated damages at issue in this case could not be intended to
remedy damages occurring to an empty building because, as CRE admits, under the
Lease, the tenant is responsible for any needed repairs to the premises. (Appellee's Brief,
21; R. 316, 331.) Nor could potential litigation costs represent an element of the
liquidated damages, as the Lease includes an attorneys' fee provision. (R. 481-90.)
Similarly, CRE's argument that a vacant building would be harder to sell at the end of the
lease period, like its argument that TCI would have served as an anchor tenant, is rank
speculation not supported by any evidence in the record. (Appellee's Brief, 21-22.)
Second, the District Court erroneously held that the second prong of Section 339
was met because the liquidated damages provision was not unconscionable. (R. 724-25.)
In CRE's own words, "Section 339 does not require a consideration of whether the
liquidated damages provision is unconscionable." (Appellee's Brief, 38.) The District
Court, however, not only considered the issue of unconscionability, but the sole basis
upon which the District Court held that Comcast failed to meet its burden under the
DMWEST #7770297 v2
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second prong of Section 339 was that the liquidated damages provision in this case was
not unconscionable, i.e., because the lessee was a sophisticated corporation, the provision
was enforceable notwithstanding proper application of the law. The District Court's
reasoning is plainly error because unconscionability, as CRE concedes, plays no role in
determining the enforceability of a liquidated damages provision.
CRE does not argue that the law of unconscionability plays a role in determining
whether damages are of a type that is difficult to estimate, or even defend the District
Court's ruling that the lack of unconscionability satisfies the second prong of Section
339. Instead, CRE argues that "Utah courts have routinely considered elements of
unconscionability in their analysis of liquidated damages provisions." (Appellee's Brief,
11.) In so arguing, CRE grossly overstates the role of the parties' relative sophistication
in determining the enforceability of liquidated damages provisions.
Reaching beyond the actual language of Utah's liquidated damages jurisprudence,
CRE argues that Utah courts "have, consciously or not, applied different standards based
on their perception of the parties." (Appellee's Brief, 29 (emphasis added).) Putting
aside for the moment the question as to how CRE can discern, let alone cite, an
"unconscious" application of law, this argument is wholly incorrect. Again, Utah has
explicitly adopted Section 339, under which the relative sophistication of the parties
plays no role. Reliance, 858 P.2d at 1366. Under Section 339, it makes no difference
whether either or both of the parties were sophisticated business entities or whether the
parties bargained for the liquidated damages provision.

DMWEST #7770297 v2

14

Moreover, CRE's analysis of the case law is riddled with speculation. For
example, in Robbins, a hearing aid company sought to enforce a liquidated damages
provision requiring a former employee to pay $5,000 for having misappropriated his
employer's sales leads. Robbins, 645 P.2d at 624-26. Robbins does observe, in dicta,
that the record did not support a finding of unconscionability. Id. at 627. Before so
observing, however, the Court had already determined that both elements of Section 339
were met. Id. Robbins is thus best understood as having first considered Section 339,
then, having determined that both elements of Section 339 w^re met, separately and
independently considering whether the liquidated damages award would be
unconscionable. In addition, Robbins addresses an employment relationship, in which
relative bargaining strength could have been in issue, not a contractual relationship
between two commercial entities. Id. at 624-27. In any event, Robbins does not stand for
the proposition that Utah courts applying Section 339 should somehow take into account
the relative sophistication of the parties.
CRE's reliance on Park Valley Corp. v. Bagley, 635 P.2d 65 (Utah 1981) is
similarly misplaced. Park Valley arose out of a forfeiture provision contained in a
uniform real estate contract. Id. at 66-67. The parties in Park Valley were a commercial
real estate enterprise and an individual purchaser of real estate. Id. At no point does Park
Valley make any mention of the relative sophistication of the parties—in fact, while the
district court in Park Valley reduced the amount of the forfeiture based on
unconscionability, this Court reversed due to the lack of evidence in the record
supporting those rulings. Id. at 68. Park Valley is better understood as an
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unconscionability case than as a liquidated damages case—indeed, it did not even
consider the enforceability of the forfeiture under Section 339. Instead, the trial court in
Park Valley made a factual determination of damages and unconscionability and this
Court reversed based on the lack of evidentiary support in the record. Either way, Park
Valley does not support CRE's position that the relative sophistication of the parties
plays a role in a Section 339 analysis.
Finally, CRE argues that in Reliance, "both parties to the contract were
sophisticated and neither party had an advantage in bargaining position." (Appellee's
Brief, 30.) While Reliance characterized the parties as "professional participants
experienced in contract formation," like Robbins, it only did so in dicta after having held
that both elements of Section 339 had been met. Reliance, 858 P.2d at 1369-70.
Reliance did not, as CRE suggests, hold that the relative sophistication of the parties was
a necessary or even important factor for analysis of liquidated damages under Section
339. In making these comments, Reliance did not expressly or impliedly state that its
analysis would have been any different had the parties not been commercial entities.
Having made its argument that Utah courts routinely uphold liquidated damages
provisions where the parties are sophisticated, despite its own acknowledgement that
such considerations play no role in an analysis under Section 339, CRE reasons that "the
story is different, however, when the courts perceive that one or both of the parties is
unsophisticated." (Appellee's Brief, 32.) To support this proposition, CRE turns to
Woodhaven, which it claims represents an example of a case in which a Utah court
perceived that at least one of the parties was unsophisticated. (Id.) Woodhaven,
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however, does not expressly or impliedly make any reference to the relative
sophistication of the parties. Id. at 922-23. CRE's claim that the contract at issue in
Woodhaven was a contract of adhesion is rank speculation. (Appellee's Brief, 32.)
Indeed, Woodhaven observed that no claim of procedural unconscionability was at issue.
Id at 925. Woodhaven actually held that the liquidated damages provision in question
was unenforceable under Section 339, but not unconscionable. Id. at 925.
CRE's reliance on Perkins as an unconscionability decision is similarly flawed.
CRE argues that Perkins "seemed concerned that neither party was aware of the
liquidated damages provision and that no special attention was given to the liquidated
damages provision." (Appellee's Brief, 35.) While Perkins observed that the parties
failed to pay any attention to the liquidated damages provision, it did not make any
specific observations as to the relative sophistication of the parties. Id. at 451. Perkins
applied Section 339 independently of any analysis of the parties' perceived
sophistication, determining that no actual damages had been incurred and that the
damages were of a type that was easily calculable. Id. at 453-54. Accordingly, Perkins
refused to enforce the forfeiture at issue. Id.
Simply put, CRE's brief vastly overstates the importance of the sophistication of
the parties in analyzing liquidated damages provisions. Section 339 itself and Utah case
law has made it clear that factors relating to unconscionability, including the parties'
relative sophistication, plays no role in consideration of a liquidated damages provision
under Section 339. Thus, the District Court's reference to the relative sophistication of
the parties in considering the second prong of Section 339 was error.
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II.

ADOPTION OF SECTION 356 OF THE RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS WOULD BRING CLARITY TO EXISTING UTAH LAW,
Adopting Section 356 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts (1981) ("Section

356") would substantially clarify Utah law on liquidated damages.7 Section 356 was
adopted for the express purpose of bringing the restatement into harmony with the
standard for enforceability set forth in Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, which
o

has been adopted in Utah and 48 of its sister states. Having been already adopted by
statute, this standard is clearly supported by public policy. CRE offers no arguments to
the contrary.
Instead, CRE argues that Comcast failed to preserve the right to argue that Section
356 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts should be applied. According to CRE,
Comcast is limited to rehashing arguments in the summary judgment briefs presented to
the trial court. Comcast, however, preserved the issue of whether the liquidated damages
provision is enforceable as a matter of law, and cited to Section 356 as relevant legal
authority for the proposition that the liquidated damages provision in this case is not
Section 356 states:
Damages for breach by either party may be liquidated but only at an
amount that is reasonable in light of the anticipated or actual loss
caused by the breach and the difficulties of proof of loss. A term
fixing unreasonably large liquidated damages is unenforceable on
the grounds of public policy as a penalty.
8

See, e ^ , Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-718 (1) ("Damages for breach by either
party may be liquidated in the agreement but only at an amount which is reasonable in the
light of the anticipated or actual harm caused by the breach, the difficulties of proof of
loss, and the inconvenience or nonfeasibility of otherwise obtaining an adequate remedy.
A term fixing unreasonably large liquidated damages is void as a penalty.")
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enforceable, quoting the provision in full in its opposition to CRE's motion for partial
summary judgment. (R. 482.)
The central issue presented by this appeal is the same issue that was presented to
the trial court, namely whether the liquidated damages provision is enforceable. As
Comcast pointed out in requesting this Court to retain the appeal, even the District Court
observed the existing test presents "a Hobson's choice," with "the question of
reasonableness becoming] somewhat circular and subjective: how can one meet a
burden of proof to demonstrate anticipated damages are reasonable and yet difficult and
impractical to prove at the same time." (R. 721 (internal quotation marks omitted).)
Presenting additional arguments in support of a position that Comcast has taken from the
outset—and suggesting that a confusing test be replaced with a workable test—is not
prohibited by O'Dea v. Plea, 2009 UT 46,115, 217 P.3d 704, Katz v. Pierce, 732 P.2d
92 (Utah 1986), or Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co.. 966 P.2d 844, 847 (Utah Ct. App.
1998). In O'Dea, this Court refused to hear constitutional, personal jurisdiction, full faith
and credit, and choice of law challenges to the dismissal of a paternity claim raised for
the first time on appeal. 2009 UT 46,fflj16-24. In Katz, this Court refused to hear a
challenge to the amount of default judgment raised for the first time on appeal. 732 P.2d
at 95. And in Badger, the Utah Court of Appeals refused to review claims concerning
private well rights that the plaintiffs had failed to raise in an administrative hearing before
the State Engineer. 966 P.2d at 847. These cases are easily distinguishable from the
present case because Comcast has argued from the outset that the liquidated damages
provision in this case is unenforceable.
DMWEST #7770297 v2

19

Badger sets forth three specific factors which help determine whether an issue has
been preserved: "(1) the issue must be raised in a timely fashion; (2) the issue must be
specifically raised; and (3) a party must introduce supporting evidence or relevant legal
authority." Id- at 847. Section 356 is not technically an "issue" to be preserved; it is
relevant legal authority, and, as urged on this appeal, should become controlling
authority. Moreover, this Court has inherent authority to consider any issue on appeal,
including issues not raised by the parties, if doing so is necessary for a proper decision.
Kaiserman Associates, Inc. v. Francis Town, 977 P.2d 462, 464 (Utah 1998). Nearly
thirty years ago, in Madsen v. Anderson, 667 P.2d 44, 47 (Utah 1983), this Court cited
Section 356 favorably for the proposition that liquidated damages agreements "are
enforceable if the amount of the liquidated damages agreed to is not disproportionate to
the damages actually sustained." This statement itself has been a cornerstone in the law
of liquidated damages in Utah. See Reliance, 858 P.2d 1363 (citing Madsen and Young
for the proposition that liquidated damages "disproportionate to the actual compensatory
damages sustained . . . may be evidence of an unreasonable forecast").
CRE also argues that this Court should not adopt Section 356 as the standard
because "replacing § 339 with § 356 would create no change in the substance of the
analysis or the law." (Appellee's Brief, 44.) The fact that adoption of Section 356 would
not be a gross departure from existing law, however, is simply another basis for this
Court to give serious consideration to its adoption. While Section 339 has been the law
of this State since Perkins was decided in 1952, Utah courts have, in practice, repeatedly
recognized that evidence of actual damages plays a role in determining the validity of a
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liquidated damages provision. See Reliance, 858 P.2d at 1367 ("If. . . the liquidated
damages are disproportionate to the actual compensatory damages sustained, this may be
evidence of an unreasonable forecast"); Woodhaven, 942 P.2d at 922 ("To determine if
the liquidated damages clause amount has a reasonable relationship to the fee, there must
at least be some evidence of the costs anticipated when the lease was executed.") Section
356 simply sets forth in a single, clear statement what Utah courts have been saying for
decades—that a liquidated damages provision is enforceable if it is reasonable in light of
the anticipated or actual loss, and that a provision that imposes an excessive award is
unenforceable. Reliance, 858 P.2d at 1367; Woodhaven, 942 P.2d at 920-922; Mattson,
802 P.2d at 106 ([Provisions for liquidated damages have been upheld the same as other
terms in the contract, except where the amount of liquidated damages "bears no
reasonable relationship to the actual damage.) Accordingly, Comcast urges this Court to
adopt Section 356 and to reverse the award of liquidated damages in this case.
III.

ADOPTING UNCONSCIONABILITY AS A STANDARD WOULD
VIOLATE UTAH LAW AND ESTABLISHED PUBLIC POLICY.
CRE argues that instead of adopting Section 356, which it admits would not

substantively change Utah law, Utah should apply a basic unconscionability standard to
liquidated damages provisions. (Appellee's Brief, 37.) In so doing, CRE invites this
Court to abandon more than fifty years of precedent and make Utah law an outlier in this
subject area.
CRE advocates adopting an unconscionability standard in order to remedy what it
labels the "confusing and unsatisfactory" state of Utah law on liquidated damages.
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(Appellee's Brief, 35.) As discussed above, however, while Utah cases on liquidated
damages are, on their surface, somewhat confusing, the overarching principles are
consistent and could be clearly stated by adopting Section 356. CRE's suggested
prescription—adoption of unconscionability as the sole basis upon which a liquidated
damages provision could be avoided—would be a catastrophe, not a remedy.
States have adopted specific standards for the enforcement of liquidated damages
as a part of their recognition that the damages allowed for a breach of contract are strictly
compensatory in nature. E.g. Robbins, 645 P.2d at 625. As a matter of policy, punitive
damages cannot be awarded for a breach of contract. Cook Assocs., Inc. v. Warnick, 664
P.2d 1161, 1167 (Utah 1983). The "strong policy reasons underlying this rule include"
the fact that "such awards discourage efficient breach, which our judicial system
encourages." Bell v. Bd. of Educ. 625 F. Supp. 2d 1211, 1219 (D.N.M. 2008).
"Breaches of contract that are in fact efficient and wealth-enhancing should be
encouraged." Thyssen, Inc. v. S.S. Fortune Star, 777 F.2d 57, 63 (2d Cir.1985). As the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has held,
Even if [a breach of contract] is deliberate, it is not necessarily
blameworthy. The promisor may simply have discovered that his
performance is worth more to someone else. If so, efficiency is
promoted by allowing him to break his promise, provided he makes
good the promisee }s actual losses. If he is forced to pay more than
that, an efficient breach may be deterred, and the law doesn't want
to bring about such a result.
Patton v. Mid-Continent Systems, Inc., 841 P.2d 742, 750 (7th Cir. 1988) (Posner, J.)
(emphasis added).
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Adopting unconscionability as the sole basis upon which a liquidated damages
provision could be negated would discourage efficient breach. Indeed, in the absence of
standards for negating a liquidated damages provision outside of unconscionability,
parties could effectively stipulate to permit punitive damages in the event of breach,
thereby narrowing the distinction between contract and tort lkw and adopting a rule that
would permit parties to profit from breach, rather than simply recovering compensatory
damages. Comcast is not suggesting that the Court take a paternalistic approach and
allow parties to lightly avoid their contractual obligations. Indeed, Comcast made every
effort to ensure that CRE was permitted to enjoy the benefit of its bargain, having paid
rent continuously since the execution of the Lease. It makes no sense, however, to
enforce a liquidated damages provision that would force Conjicast to either make use of a
facility for which it has no use or pay more than triple the rent.
Contrary to CRE's argument, there is no basis upon which the Court could
"assume that Comcast believed the provision was reasonable when it drafted the
provision." (Appellee's Brief, 16.) Despite CRE's characterization of Comcast as the
drafter, the record is clear that the TCI's agent drafted the Lease using boilerplate
language. (R. 212-234, 718.) Nor may the Court assume, as CRE suggests, that
"Comcast included the liquidated damages provision with the understanding that, if it
ever breached the lease, it could claim the provision was unenforceable and escape its
operation." (Appellee's Brief, 16.) It is the law and the record below that will determine
this appeal, not CRE's assumptions. The types of damages that were available in the
event of a breach of this Lease are readily apparent from the Lease itself. Allowing
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punitive damages to be imposed for a breach of contract is wholly contrary to Utah law
and public policy. Accordingly, the District Court's judgment should be reversed.9
IV.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER CRE'S
UNDISPUTED FAILURE TO MITIGATE ITS DAMAGES.
CRE does not dispute that it owed a general duty to mitigate its damages, but

claims that under the circumstances of this case "there was nothing more CRE could have
done to mitigate its damages." (Appellee's Brief, 45.) CRE, however, acknowledges that
it could have hired its own agent to seek a new tenant and failed to do so. (Appellee's
Brief, 47.) Again, it is undisputed that CRE's only effort to mitigate was to refer
inquiries to Comcast's agent. CRE clearly could have done more to locate a new tenant,
and could have further mitigated its damages had it made efforts to sell or lease the
premises. It is telling that CRE speculates that Comcast's failure to continuously occupy
the premises negatively impacted the value of its property, given the total absence of
evidence in the record to indicate that CRE made any attempt to sell the building. The
record plainly indicates that CRE did nothing more than sit on its hands and allow
liquidated damages to accrue.
In addition, CRE does not defend the District Court's failure to assess the impact
of CRE's failure to mitigate, nor could it. The District Court's ruling is based on the
erroneous legal conclusion that "the contract specified that the building was to be
occupied by TCI, not just any commercial tenant." (R. 655.) Because of this, the District
9

If the Court were to abandon fifty-plus years of Utah law on liquidated
damages and adopt unconscionability as the standard, it should do so only prospectively,
and the judgment awarded in this case should still be reversed.
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Court concluded that "[wjhere the contract specified particularly that TCI was to occupy
the building, the Court will not speculate as to what CRE could or should have done to
secure another tenant." (Id-) This reasoning is pure error. CRE has acknowledged
throughout this litigation that the presence of a subtenant constitutes operation of the
Property for the purposes of the Lease. (R. 719-20; Appellee's Brief 7-8, 46-47.)
Accordingly, the judgment should be reversed.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, and those stated in Comcast's principal brief, Comcast
respectfully requests this Court to reverse the District Court's judgment, declare the
liquidated damages provision at issue in this case unenforceable as a matter of law, and
remand this case for further proceedings.
DATED this 23rd day of August 2010.
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